Project Mustard Seed
Project Day
Project Asklepios
Project Hip
Project Scottsdale
Project Kenko
Project Wakagumi
Project Arboretum
Project Sulawesi
The issue. The client wanted the first focused tertiary hospital in the Philippines devoted to cancer care. A greenfield, not an extension of an existing ward. Before ground was broken, the market had to be sized, the competitors named, and the business case built around a value proposition patients would actually choose.
The questions.
How big is the cancer treatment market in the Philippines, and how much of it can a new hospital realistically take?
Who already treats these patients, and where is the opening they are not covering?
What value proposition makes a patient choose this hospital over the incumbent, the overseas option, or waiting?
What assets have to be in place before the model reaches scale, and which of them can wait?
The outcome. The competitive set was profiled and the market was modeled, not asserted. Share estimates for a hospital that did not yet exist were built from the structure of the market, not from a capacity assumption. Those estimates went straight into the business plan and the financial model the client used to set its entry strategy. The client broke ground on the first facility, targeting an opening in late 2023.
2023 Strategic Plan Briefing
The issue. A full planning year was opening, and the big ideas that will actually move Philippine healthcare had not been pressure-tested in one room. Parent and subsidiary leadership needed a common view of what is coming, before the plan locked in last year’s assumptions.
The questions.
What are the questions about the future of Philippine healthcare that the planning cycle has not yet faced in detail?
What outcomes does the industry have to prepare for, or decide it will not chase?
The outcome. Every C-level executive, from the parent to the subsidiaries, sat through one briefing and argued the consequences. Six forces, taken in turn. The metaverse, only where it changes how care is delivered or paid for. Private capital as the bridge for public health outcomes the state will not fund alone. The manpower shortage, and what breaks if it is treated as a hiring problem rather than a capacity problem. Digitalization that reaches the patient, not a system that only reports. The backlog in non-Covid procedures, still sitting in the demand the pandemic deferred. And where creativity is a strategy, not a slogan, in building the Philippine healthcare system that comes next.
The issue. Senior leadership across the Metro Pacific Hospitals group had to face the future of Philippine healthcare together, not hospital by hospital. The briefing was set for the full executive team, covering every hospital in the group. The risk was a planning year built on last year’s assumptions, repeated at scale.
The questions.
1. What are the questions about the future of Philippine healthcare that have not yet been worked through in detail?
2. What outcomes does the industry have to prepare for, or decide it will not chase?
The outcome. The entire senior group sat the same briefing. One set of questions. Every hospital in the room. The point was a shared view of what can change the plan, taken before each unit wrote its own.
PH Healthcare Industry Briefing
The issue. Healius wanted to build an outsourced medical laboratory business serving hospitals and clinics. The market was fragmented, the entry path was unwritten, and a foreign operator cannot price a greenfield off its home-market economics. Industry diligence had to come before the entry strategy.
The questions.
How big is the Philippine pathology market, and which segments are actually outsourced?
What does the competitive set look like once the fragments are named, not averaged?
Where does growth come from, and which of it is available to a new entrant?
How does Healius enter, and what does it refuse to do in year one?
The outcome. The market was sized and segmented, not described. Fragmented competition was profiled competitor by competitor, so share was an estimate rather than a slogan. Growth opportunities were separated into what the industry will produce and what an entrant can take. That work became the market-entry strategy: where to go first, which hospitals and clinics are the buyer, and which parts of a fragmented market are not worth the chase.
The issue. Everlife, out of Singapore, wanted to acquire a Philippine distributor of in-vitro diagnostics, including the Bio-Rad line, covering tests and medical equipment. The seller’s growth rate was not the question. The question was whether that growth was the market, the principal, or the company, and whether it would still be there after the close.
The questions.
How big is the Philippine in-vitro diagnostics market, and how fast is it actually growing?
What is the target’s own growth potential, and is it sustainable once the current principals and customers are pressure-tested?
Where can the target outperform, and where is it simply riding the market?
The outcome. Demand was segmented by customer, by channel, and by principal, so the revenue was no longer one number. Growth opportunities in Philippine in-vitro diagnostics were separated from the growth already sitting in the target’s book. The target was then scored on a harder test: can it grow faster than the market, and can it take share from the competitors who already call on the same hospitals and laboratories?
The issue. CVC Capital Partners, out of Singapore, wanted into Philippine healthcare and was looking at a stake in Metro Pacific Hospitals. A financial sponsor does not need a tour of the sector. It needs to know whether this hospital’s numbers hold, and whether the system around it can still grow.
The questions.
What is the target hospital actually earning, and which of those earnings repeat?
Where does growth in the hospital system come from, and how much of it is still available?
What are the risks that cap that growth, and which opportunities survive them?
The outcome. Commercial and financial analysis were run together, not in sequence. The target’s performance was read against the prospects of the system it sits in. Risks and opportunities were scored for one decision: whether a stake in the group was a way into Philippine healthcare, or a way into someone else’s maturity curve.
Project Spratly
The issue. St. Luke’s wanted a new hospital in Davao and needed the market read, and the business plan, before the board was asked to approve a project. Brand does not travel by itself. Occupancy does not follow a logo into a market the incumbents already hold.
The questions.
How big is the healthcare market in Davao, and how much of it is unserved rather than merely distant from Manila?
Who already runs the hospitals there, and where are they weak enough to lose a patient?
How large a facility can St. Luke’s open, and which treatments earn the right to be in it on day one?
The outcome. Viability was tested in the market, not in a deck. Consumers and businesses were interviewed across eight cities before Davao was confirmed as the site. The business case then fixed what a survey cannot: hospital size, the major units, utilization and occupancy, and a commercialization model a board can approve against. The financial model was built for the approval decision.
Project Touchdown
Project X
The issue. Luoxin Pharmaceuticals wanted into Philippine generics and needed an entry plan, including whether to build, partner, or buy. A home-market cost advantage does not survive contact with local barriers, local players, and unit economics that look nothing like the plant gate.
The questions.
How large is the Philippine generics market, and which part of it is actually contestable?
How does a new player compete once price is no longer the only weapon?
Who already holds the channel, and which of them can be displaced?
What do the unit economics look like after duties, distribution, and the discount the market demands?
The outcome. The value chain was researched end to end, from manufacturer to the point of sale, with industry interviews rather than a desk summary. Structure, major players, barriers, and unit economics were put in one frame. The entry strategy was then written against that frame, including the M&A paths and the paths that were not worth opening.
The issue. Navis Capital Partners, a Malaysian private equity firm, wanted a stake in the Qualimed hospital group. Buy-side diligence had to answer a sponsor’s question, not a clinician’s. Is the system running as the plan says, and can the growth in the model be sustained after the close?
The questions.
What is the current running state of the Qualimed system, stripped of the seller’s trajectory?
Who are the competitors that can take a patient, a doctor, or a price point?
Where can Qualimed grow faster than the healthcare market, rather than with it?
What has to remain true for that growth to hold after the merger?
The outcome. Market size, share, pricing, and margins were read together, so growth and margin improvement were separate claims. The scaling of new hospitals and clinics was set against what earlier players in the same industry actually delivered, not against the plan’s year-five. The post-merger business plan was then tested for sustainability. The client left with a point of view on what the stake was worth, and on which synergies survive contact with the way the system already runs.
The issue. Unilab wanted the industry seen as one system: how large it is, where value is created, which segments earn, and which are growing. Without that map, capital goes to the segment the company already understands, not to the segment that pays.
The questions.
How big is Philippine healthcare, once every segment is counted rather than the one the client already serves?
What does the value chain look like from the first input to the patient?
Which segments hold the profit, and which only hold the revenue?
Which of those segments are growing fast enough to matter in the next plan?
The outcome. More than 36 companies were benchmarked across 12 segments. Leaders and laggards were named in each, so “the market” stopped being an average. The value chain was mapped end to end. Unilab left with a view of where the profit in Philippine healthcare actually sits, and where the next growth is, including the segments outside its current portfolio.
The issue. The Japan International Cooperation Agency wanted the high-potential segments Japanese health and wellness companies could actually target. Attitude was the missing fact. A demographic is not a buyer, and a product that works in Japan does not arrive with its demand attached.
The questions.
How do Philippine age groups, from young to old, actually think about health, and where do those views diverge?
Which products and segments match a demand that already exists, rather than a demand the exporter hopes to create?
The outcome. Consumers were surveyed on a random sample, cut by age, so the market was no longer one Filipino patient. Attitudes were quantified group by group. Japanese healthcare companies left with a point of view on where a product can be brought in, and where the attitude gap makes the entry a speculative decision.
The issue. Marubeni wanted a controlling stake in Aide, a Philippine on-demand healthcare startup. A strategic buyer does not need a product demo. It needs to know whether the market will adopt the behavior, and whether this company can hold the customer once competitors, including the ones not yet in the market, show up.
The questions.
How large is the market for digital healthcare apps in the Philippines, once curiosity is separated from demand?
What adoption is realistic for on-demand care, and what has to be true for that rate to hold?
Who are the competitors already in the space, and who is latent?
How does Aide compete with both, rather than with the rival it prefers to name?
The outcome. Buy-side diligence covered the market, the adoption rate, the competitive set, and the scalability of the model. Likely growth was tied to those facts, not to the download curve. Risks and opportunities were scored for one decision: whether buying control was a way into Philippine digital care, or a way into a behavior the patient has not yet adopted.
The issue. The government needed transaction advice on a major healthcare public-private partnership: how to expand PGH’s capability in Diliman, Quezon City, and how to bring that project to investors. A feasibility study that never faces the market is a document. A PPP that skips the sounding is a tender nobody bids.
The question.
How should the Philippine government structure a PPP so PGH Diliman expands capacity, and private capital still has a reason to show up?
The outcome. The expansion was structured as a PPP. The feasibility study was completed. An external market sounding tested whether the structure would attract a bid before the government asked for approval.
The issue. AC Health wanted the feasibility of a new hospital in Davao, and a business case that could survive local realities a Manila model does not price. Potential is not the same as a market that will fill the facility after competitors respond.
The questions.
What is the real potential for AC Health to open in Davao, not the potential for “a hospital”?
How big is the market a new entrant can take, once existing capacity is counted?
Who are the major competitors, and how will they respond to the move?
The outcome. The market study and the competitive study were run together. The resources required to succeed in Davao were profiled, not assumed. AC Health could then see the local variables that decide the project: what drives growth, how products and services segment, and the constraint that does not show up in a demand chart.